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If looks could kill, they probably will, In games without frontiers -war without tears.
-Peter Gabriel
This article addresses the topic of war, which is not ordinarily considered germane to academic studies of corporate law. 1 A few cases from the Vietnam era are sometimes included in contemporary corporation casebooks. 2 But in an academic milieu dominated by considerations and calculations of economic costs and benefits, mainstream corporate law teachers tend recently to avoid thinking seriously about issues of business ethics and social responsibility. Two of the most prominent professors of corporate law, for example, have gone so far as to claim that "the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law among the business, government, and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions" has resulted in a world in which " [t] here is no serious competitor" to this view of the corporation. 3 "The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors," these two authors conclude, "is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago." 4 They therefore declare "the end of history in corporate law" and predict that "the ideological and competitive attractions of the standard model will become indisputable" with "convergence in most aspects of the law and practice of corporate governance . . . sure to follow." 4 Id. at 468. 5 Id. at 439, 468. The unspoken reference is to the controversial claim in social theory more generally of "an end of history" after the Cold War. See HISTORY (1999) . Other leading academics in corporate law agree that a convergence in corporate governance regimes is likely to occur globally, but disagree about the form of this convergence. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global political power to rival many nation-states in comparative size and relative influence. Economic globalization and the multinational corporations that support it have significant implications for theories of modern war.
Part II turns to reconsider the perennially important topic of the nature and purposes of the business corporation in the context of modern war. It reviews the standard understanding of corporate governance involving not only economic obligations, but also legal constraints and ethical considerations. Accepted restatements of the fundamental principles of corporate law are not, as some academic commentators might prefer, encomia to the single-minded pursuit of economic values. Instead, they recognize the importance of law and ethics as components to the development of corporate purposes. In this context, the legal and ethical obligations of business corporations with respect to issues of war and peace are considered.
Part III draws some conclusions from this consideration of the nature of war and business corporations. Briefly, it argues that a serious consideration of the moral and political importance of issues of war and peace in modern society requires a major qualification to the standard lawand-economics, shareholders-only view of the corporation. An understanding the important interconnections between modern war and the business corporation reveals that theories of the social nature and purposes of business corporations have not yet reached an historical end.
To expand on Peter Gabriel's lyrics quoted at the outset, economic globalization has meant that businesses increasingly play in "games without frontiers." 7 Enhanced technological capabilities, as well as a hardening of hearts arguably made possible by evolution of modern 7 As Joseph White has pointed out, the metaphor of the "game" is very commonly used in business settings. B. Joseph White, Remarks at Conference on Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable Peace, University of Michigan Business School, Nov. 3, 2001 . War is also often conceived in terms of game theories and studied through war games. See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 203-07, 223 (2001 ed.) (1959) (describing war as one game among others played by states 4 forms of social organization, has also made possible "war without tears." 8 This article argues that human society should strive against the economic, moral, and political outcome of perpetual global war, and building the institutions necessary for peace should include attention to the social structure of modern business corporations.
I. On the Nature of Modern War
One basic principle that has not changed is that "war not healthy for children and other living things." 9 A recent documentary estimates that two million children have been killed in wars in the last ten years. 10 Tragically, as seen in Afghanistan, Africa, and elsewhere, the use of children as soldiers is "more and more common." 11 Surely, "the love of children -with their need for attention and care -is a moral bond that should transcend every local and national barrier." 12 Leo Tolstoy's view remains true today: "War is not polite recreation but the vilest thing in life, and we ought to understand that and not play at war. Our attitude towards the fearful necessity of war ought to be stern and serious."
13
Carl von Clausewitz probably remains the leading social theorist of war, at least since the ancient Chinese writer, Sun Tzu, and the ubiquitous European political theorist, Machiavelli. 14 in international politics). 8 One might even argue that the history of military organization into armies, navies, and other disciplined organizational forms is the story of divorcing moral sensibilities from warfare. For an argument that Western superiority on the battlefield lies precisely in its moral ability to inflict maximum destruction on enemies, see VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES IN rubric of "the interests of the whole community" -though it is possible that "policy may take a false direction" and "promote unfairly the ambitious ends" of "private interests" or "the vanity of rulers."
20
In this context, business corporations -to the extent that they were just beginning to come into existence in the nineteenth century -might have been considered instruments of the nation-states in which they were based. 21 In the time of Clausewitz, the size and influence of 15 business firms were for the most part negligible. For macro-analytic purposes, business entities could be subsumed under national interests. For much of the twentieth century as well, this view of the subordinate relationship of business corporations under nation-states that were seen to give them existence, may have been sufficient, though even relatively early in the twentieth century concerns began to arise about the possibility of corporate "war merchants" influencing national politics in an belligerent direction. 22 Historical evidence also suggests that wars have sometimes been fought for reasons for "a minority of financial and industrial interests" that may reap "great profit" as a result, even though overall national interests are rarely advanced by aggressive war.
23
In general terms, however, the problem of war in the days of Clausewitz, and perhaps through most of the twentieth century, could be conceived adequately as a problem of "the state system" international politics.
24
Today, however, business corporations can no longer be so easily compartmentalized, and neither can the problem of modern war. Increasingly, business corporations act internationally and transnationally, citizens of the world rather than any particular nation-state. 25 In about thirty years, from 1969 to 1990, the number of multinational firms more than tripled, from 7,000 to 23 WALTZ, supra note __, at 145 (citing John Hobson's historical study of the Boer War, but criticizing the thesis of "imperialism" as a general cause of war). Some wars may well result when "certain well-organized business interests are able to outweigh the weak, diffused interests" in a country, but such wars of "imperialism" are "an expensive form of folly" for "the nation as a whole." Id. at 145-46 (citing and quoting Hobson). 24 46 Id. at 23. 47 Id. 48 Id. For a description and analysis of the recent "shift" in emphasis from political states to economic markets, see Yergin & Stanislaw, supra note __, at 11-17, 125-51, 369-91. 49 Benhabib, supra note __, at 5.
Globalization thus transforms the nature of war. 50 According to Martin van Creveld, the post-Westphalian period of the dominance nation-states and the paradigm of war as primarily involving conflict among nation-states is now ending. 51 In van Creveld's words,
The state, which since the middle of the seventeenth century has been the most important and most characteristic of all modern institutions, is in decline. From Western Europe to Africa, many existing state are either combining into larger communities or falling apart. . . . Globally speaking, the international system is moving away from an assembly of distinct, territorial, sovereign, legally equal states toward different, more hierarchical, and in many ways more complicated structures. As far as individual states are concerned, there are good reasons to think that many of them will soon no longer be either willing or able to control and protect the political, military, economic, social, and cultural lives of their citizens to the extent that they used to. Needless to say, these developments affect each and every individual now living on this planet. In some places, these will proceed peacefully, but in others they are likely to result in -indeed are already leading toupheavals as profound, and possible as bloody, as those that propelled humanity out of the Middle Ages and into the modern world.
52
In a globalized society, simplified versions of Clausewitz no longer apply. Instead, nation-states are losing their grip on their monopolies of violence. Global society may be returning to a world characterized by complex struggles in which "political, social, economic, and religious motives" become "hopelessly entangled." 53 If so, then we may well expect the return to prominence of "mercenaries" and "swarms of private armies" such as those that characterized the period of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War in Europe.
54
Perhaps the leading contemporary theorist of war, John Keegan, agrees with the premises of this diagnosis. According to Keegan, war has become too expensive for modern rich states to 50 For a leading recent treatment of this topic, see MARTIN L. VAN wage against each other in its "full potentiality," but it has also "become, paradoxically, a cheap and deadly undertaking for poor states, for enemies of the state idea, and for factions in states falling apart." 55 Rather than states, we therefore face new kinds of enemies. "The rogue ruler, the terrorist and the fundamentalist movement, the ethnic or religious faction," Keegan writes,
"are all enemies as serious as any, in an age of junk weapons, as civilization has ever faced."
56
In other words, new technologies and the political challenges of war in a modern, globalized world have changed significantly. Limited rather than unlimited war becomes the rule, rather than the exception. 57 As General Wesley Clark writes, military actions in this "difficult region"
are "not quite war -not quite peace."
58
At the same time that Keegan recognizes technological and political changes in the nature of modern war, however, he criticizes Clausewitz's traditional conception on normative grounds.
Keegan sees Clausewitz as producing "the most pernicious philosophy" of war "yet conceived"
because it views war as "a value free activity, outside the moral sphere." 59 The history of the catastrophes of the "short" twentieth century and its two global wars provide graphic evidence that Clausewitz was mistaken in thinking that the "rational" calculations of national interests by states would limit warfare. 58 Id. at 458. In this middling region between unlimited war and international criminal police actions, Clark includes "limited war, pre-and post-conflict operations, and 'nation building'." Id. 59 Id. at 41-42. 60 For Keegan, Clausewitz's theory therefore at least implicitly provided a justification for the totalitarian state. Id. at 42. For an account of "the short twentieth century" as including the "catastrophe" of two world wars, see HABERMAS, supra note __, at 37-57. As Waltz argues, Rousseau had, prior to Clausewitz, made a convincing theoretical case that nation-states acting in their own self-interests -even as aggregated in a "general will" -have globalized character. War changes over time.
61 "Like a disease," again according to Keegan, "it exhibits the capacity to mutate, and mutates fastest in the fact of efforts to control or eliminate it." 62 Keegan defines war as "collective killing for some collective purpose." 63 (1994) . Although intended to be "consistent with case law," Section 2.01 has "sparked controversy" among commentators. Bradley, et al., supra note __, at 48. As my colleague, Alan Strudler, emphasized in discussions with me, the ALI's restatement of the corporate objective as "enhancing corporate profits and shareholder gain" is not synonymous with Friedman's injunction "to make the most money possible." The latter seems to lead to an imperative of "shareholder value maximization," while the softer verb "enhance" seems to allow for non-maximizing value strategies (including profit "satisficing") and perhaps even the addition of multiple objectives, including what the ALI formally structures as exceptions to the economic objective, namely, socially responsible objectives of following the law and acting ethically. The ALI's "enhancing corporate profits and shareholder gain" language is probably best interpreted as a compromise between contending views of the business corporation in society. If correct, this interpretation would provide further evidence that "end of history" in corporate law has not been reached. Academic debates can and should continue about the proper place of corporate governance within the larger society. 72 A good argument can made, therefore, for an international agreement to ban PMCs, though the social forces of globalization may make such an agreement difficult to achieve. At the same time, it is accurate to observe that the rise of PMCs responds to "the pullback of western nations and the United Nations from peacekeeping and peace enforcing" missions, especially in poor or developing countries. 92 At least, the international community should seek to regulate the actions and behavior of PMCs, probably through an international treaty -in other words, through the development of morally informed legal constraints. 93 Already in the United States, for example, some regulation is provided under the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act. 94 The Arms Export Control Act provides conditions for the foreign sale of U.S. goods and services, and the Export Administration Act regulates the export and sale of so-called "dual-use" material that has both civilian and military applications. 95 Similar controls are imposed in other countries. 96 International regulation of private companies engaged in the actual provision of military services as "modern mercenaries," however, is lacking, if not entirely absent.
B. Legal Constraints on the Business of War
Contrary to what one might assume from a strict shareholders-only view of the business corporation, the accepted general rule in the United States is that a corporation has an obligation 91 Id. 92 Id. at 5. 93 Id. at 7. 94 Id. 95 Id. n.18.
to follow the law, in the words of the American Law Institute, "to the same extent as a natural person." 97 The Reporters' comments on this requirement make clear that "cost-benefit analysis," though it may have an appropriate role in government determinations about the adoption of legal rules, should not apply to a corporation's own decision whether or not to comply with the law.
Because "the resulting legal rule normally represents a community decision that the conduct is wrongful as such," then "cost-benefit analysis whether to obey the rule is out of place."
98
This requirement to follow the law even if it is not economically convenient to do so is mandatory, in contrast to the permissively formulated ethical and philanthropic qualifications.
99
The Principles of Corporate Law recognize, however, that the requirement to follow the law finds its own justification in the "moral norm of obedience to law." 100 The legitimacy of this norm derives in turn from the democratic legitimacy of governments that enact the law. 2000). 110 On the other hand, one can argue that corporate policies to disobey the law -even for a presumably trivial reason like speeding or parking tickets -should be treated more severely because of the organizational and deliberate nature of a decision about policy, rather than seat-of-the-pants decisions by natural persons to comply with traffic laws (or not). 134 However, in reaching its result, the court discussed the Nazi-era Nuremberg cases against the wartime German industrialists to apply the relevant international legal principles. 135 
In addition to following the law, both Milton Friedman and the Principles of Corporate
Governance recognize ethical constraints on business beyond formal legal requirements.
142
Ethical business practices do not begin and end with the law. Again as Melvin Eisenberg writes, Section 2.01's discussions of "ethical considerations" express a common sense understanding about corporate governance: "We don't want a society in which people are encouraged to become amoral when they become corporate executives. We don't want a society in which managers check their ethics at the door." Friedman's reference to "ethical custom" is much more general than the ALI's discussion of various ethical qualifications.
143 Eisenberg, supra note __, at 5.
Another example from an illustration in the Principles of Corporate Governance and adapted further by Eisenberg in a recent article should be sufficient to prove the general point that compulsory moral obligations should sometimes constrain a corporate action even when it is not technically illegal.
Corporation D is a large publicly held corporation engaged in the manufacture of powerful computers, with annual earnings of $ 60-70 million. D has been negotiating with a North African country for the sale of three computers. Negotiations were essentially complete, and a contract ready to sign, when the State Department announced that within the next few days the President would adopt an executive order prohibiting the shipment of certain high-technology products to that country, because its conduct was highly inimical to the United States and threatened the stability of the entire area. In other words, the State Department was going to add the country to a list of states that sponsored international terrorism. The State Department announced, however, that the formal legal prohibition would not be applied to contracts made before the order became effective, but urged voluntary compliance as of the date of the announcement. It was clear that when the executive order became effective it would apply to D's computers. D estimates that the sale would generate earnings of $6 million, and that short-and long-term costs entailed by completing the sale would not be significant. D nevertheless decides not to sign the contract, because its officials believe that sale of the computers would contravene a strong and clearly announced national policy. D's action is not only proper but ethically compelled. , 1994) . 160 The distinction between killing and letting die is often considered a specific instance of a more general distinction between doing and allowing. Alistrair Norcross, Introduction, KILLING AND LETTING DIE, supra note __, at 9. seems worse to contribute weapons of war to a tyrannical regime that result in the unjustified deaths of many people than to fail to make charitable contributions to good cause in society (including the cause of a just war or good government). The philosophical complications in this area are considerable and require references to specific situations to work out correctly, but for the purposes here it is enough to show that Section 2.01's division between what might be though of as ethical duties -and permissions -may make substantive philosophical sense. The world is morally complicated (as well as complicated in many other ways). Therefore, it makes sense to identify clear moral constraints as opposed to moral permissions. The former, of course, should be taken much more seriously when a person (or corporation) faces a choice of action. 161 Still, one worries about the fact that Section 2.01 refers to moral constraints themselves only as "permissive."
162 One might interpret this provision to allow for quite evil corporate acts as long as they are legal. Only a cursory reflection on the problems of war crimes, genocide, and other major human rights violations discussed above, should be sufficient to dispel this notion.
Probably, Section 2.01 should recognize that at least some moral requirements are imperative, not merely "permissive" or "voluntary." The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance err on the side of caution by avoiding a straightforward statement that corporations must adhere to 161 The distinction between moral constraints and permissions does not correspond with a further subset of ethically "superogatory" behavior. This term is used to refer to unusually good or heroic behavior of a kind that most people cannot be expected to perform. Very brave acts for good ends in the face of grave risks of death, for example, are praised but not expected as a rule. In the terms employed here, a corporation could act in a "superogatory" fashion in promoting, for example, a peaceful world above and beyond the expectations of the public. But this would be a kind of permissive ethical behavior; other permissive ethical behavior may be expectedsuch as some form or amount of corporate charitable contribution -that is not superogatory. 162 The ALI's official comment goes so far as to state explicitly that "Section 2.01(b)(2) does not impose a legal obligation to take ethical considerations into account." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note __, § 2.01 cmt. h at 64. It goes on to say that "the absence of a legal obligation . . . does not mean that corporate decisionmakers are not subject to the same ethical obligations of other members of society." Id. But this double-negative construction does not make the statement in favor of corporate ethical obligations very strong. Moreover, in some cases, particular when the support of wars may be involved, corporations may in fact have greater responsibilities than ordinary citizens in making ethical decisions whether or not to support given military activities, given the likelihood of their decisions having a larger social impact. this fact raises a very difficult political issue of isolating the business interests of "the military industrial complex" from political decision making about war and peace. 166 On the other hand, business competition may also provide what William James called "the moral equivalent of war" needed for the permanent institution of peace. 167 "History is a bath of blood," observes James.
168
Today -after two world wars have been fought since James wrote his famous essay -some still say "peace" when they mean "war expected" or even "permanent, unceasing" war. 169 Building a global civilization that includes competitive business enterprises and economic markets may, perhaps, point the direction toward a "substitute for war's disciplinary function," as well as its psychological and even aesthetic attractiveness to human beings. 170 By taming the business corporation, we might also tame ourselves.
William James also observed that "war-making is due to definite motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable criticisms, such like any other form of enterprise." 171 Business corporations have been instruments of war, but they can also serve the cause of "the institution of peace." 172 In a globalizing and increasingly interdependent world, there is a strong argument for "an intellectual duty to proclaim the inconceivability of war." 173 To do so, however, does not itself advance the practical conditions of peace. 174 Building institutions of peace will require, again in the words of James, a "a future when acts of war shall be outlawed as between civilized peoples." 175 New and improved structures of international law, including "institutionalized restraints and institutionalized methods of altering and adjusting interests," will be required.
176
This future civilization, however, will also need large business corporations not only to perform an economic objective, but also to abide by the law and to act ethically. Then, perhaps we can hope to establish at least improved probabilities for "a reign of peace."
177

Conclusion
Sadly and tragically, peace will not come without the collective monopolization of force that makes war possible. The threat of new enemies, including international terrorists, "requires that the responsible powers, committed to . . . peace, must be able to deploy forces of the highest quality, human as well as technological, to any part of the globe at all times." 178 Clausewitz writes memorably that
If bloody slaughter is a horrible spectacle, then it should only be a reason for treating war with more respect, but not for making the sword we bear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until once again someone steps in with a sword that is sharp and hews away the arms from our bodies.
179
Business corporations therefore have an essential role to play in the enterprise of peace, even as they contribute to the modern armories of war, but they -and the social and political institutions that regulate them -must take their responsibilities seriously and with the proper ethical gravity.
War is not merely a game for business to play for profits. If war is a game, it is a very serious one that requires ethics and legal regulation as well as economics. 175 James, supra note __, at 52-53. 176 WALTZ, supra note __, at 231. 177 James, supra note __, at __. As Waltz argues, it may ask too much to hope for a true and everlasting peace on earth. But we might at least in improve the odds by "decreasing the incidence of war" and "increasing the chances of peace." WALTZ, supra note __, at 1.
178 KEEGAN, supra note __, at 68.
In this article, I have not provided many practical answers to the question of how business corporations can be better regulated or how business executives can make better moral decisions with respect to war. But I hope at least to have raised these issues as serious ones deserves of academic and practical attention. Useful future research may include the following list of topics:
• What current national and international regulations constrain corporate profitmaking in supply the goods and services of war? How can national laws such as the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act be improved or supplemented? What lessons may be learned from other countries? What would a comparative study of these laws recommend in terms of possible international regulation in this area?
• Should special laws constrain the participation of military-related businesses in political lobbying and campaign financing? If so, how?
179 WALTZ, supra note __, at 221 (quoting Clausewitz).
• How should the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Prevention Act be interpreted or amended with respect to claims against business corporations, as well as individuals, by victims of human rights violations? How would such interpretations or amendments either promote peace or be counterproductive to this end?
• Should the novel and growing form of "private military companies" that appear to be in the thriving business of providing mercenary military services be regulated at the international level? If so, how? Are there benefits to private military companies in a world in which the relative power of nation-states is declining?
• How should the law of corporate governance -both national and internationalbe changed to reflect a realistic and humane conception of the important of business corporations in matters of war and peace, as well as the promotion of economic well-being? How can corporate executives be given the flexibility to act ethically on these issues, without giving them the latitude to abuse their power and authority?
• What are the current best practices of corporations in the defense industry in terms of ethical and legal compliance programs? How can ethical and legal behavior in the defense industry be encouraged both nationally and internationally?
• What kinds of ethical issues do different companies in different businesses related
